consensus progress assumptions (authored by agents unless marked đ§)
main findings
- four primary protocol arguments audited
- handwritten mathematical proofs; not machine-checked implementation proofs
- safety: no conflicting decisions
- liveness: eventual decisions under stated environment premises
- correct participant: follows the protocol and authentication assumptions
- Byzantine participant: may behave arbitrarily within authentication limits
- view/round: one attempt under a designated leader
- inference: âalways finishesâ needs an explicit conditional contract
- delivery, execution, timers, leader schedule, fault threshold
DworkâLynchâStockmeyer partial synchrony
- Consensus in the Presence of Partial Synchrony
- Cynthia Dwork, Nancy Lynch, Larry Stockmeyer
- JACM 35(2):288â323, 1988; primary PDF
- two different contracts
- finite fixed message-delay/processor-speed bounds exist but are unknown
- known bounds become valid after an unknown stabilization time
- GST: global stabilization time
- abstract, p288: âthe bounds are known, but are only guaranteed to hold starting at some unknown time Tâ
- §§1.2â1.3 separate communication and processing bounds
- packet delivery alone cannot make a never-scheduled process compute
- theorem 4.1(b), pp303â304: authenticated Byzantine consensus
- completely synchronous processors; eventual bounded communication
- N â„ 3t+1; N participants; at most t faulty
- consistency, strong unanimity, termination over arbitrary value domains
- theorem 4.2: corresponding unknown communication-bound result
- a different execution model
- theorem 3.2: basic-round termination argument
- correct leaderâs trying phase after lock release following GST
- §1.2, p290: safety separated from conditional termination
- inference: unknown GST does not yield a fixed deadline from pre-GST request arrival
- after-GST latency also depends on the processing/clock model
PBFT
- Practical Byzantine Fault Tolerance
- Miguel Castro, Barbara Liskov
- OSDI 1999, pp173â186; official paper
- §3 contract
- §4.5 proof sketch
- contract
- at most (nâ1)/3 faulty replicas
- correct-party authentication cannot be forged
- deterministic replicated execution
- continued retransmission; qualified growth of message delay
- §3: âclients eventually receive replies to their requestsâ
- delay(t): first send at time t until eventual receipt
- growth condition compares delay(t) with 2^t
- not literally fixed Î after GST
- §4.5.2: exponential timers and overlapping views
- prevent starting view changes too early or too late
- rotate through primaries until a correct one gets enough time
- âunless message delays grow faster than the timeout period indefinitelyâ
- proof boundary
- implementation evaluated; mathematical proof sketched
- no machine-checked proof of every implementation line in this paper
HotStuff
- HotStuff: BFT Consensus in the Lens of Blockchain
- Maofan Yin, Dahlia Malkhi, Michael K. Reiter, Guy Golan Gueta, Ittai Abraham
- PODC 2019; inspected arXiv v6
- paper; implementation
- §3 contract
- fixed n=3f+1 replicas; at most f Byzantine
- authenticated reliable communication
- known Î; unknown GST; correct-party delivery within Î afterward
- safety independent of eventual timing recovery
- Basic HotStuff theorem 4, p9
- correct leader; correct replicas remain in one view for bounded Tf after GST
- enough new-view information resolves stale locks
- subsequent voting phases reach a decision
- §5, p11: Pacemaker coordinates progress
- aligns leader/replicas long enough
- supplies a proposal correct replicas can support
- §4 suggests rotating leaders and exponential timeout growth
- appendix A, p22: chained variant qualification
- âtwo consecutive leaders are correctâ
- liveness argument: âIt is omitted for brevity.â
- inference: single-view completion does not establish eventual selection of that view
- proof boundary
- handwritten protocol argument and implementation pseudocode
- deployed Pacemaker implementation not machine-checked here
Tendermint
- The latest gossip on BFT consensus
- Ethan Buchman, Jae Kwon, Zarko Milosevic
- arXiv 1807.04938; 2018; inspected v3 DRAFT November 25, 2019
- paper; historical implementation
- §II.A, pp3â4: partial synchrony plus gossip
- âall communication among correct processes after GST is reliable and â-timelyâ
- sent or received messages propagate to all correct processes
- extra gossip property includes previously observed evidence
- §III, p5: algorithm premises
- faulty voting power below one third of total power
- weighted round-robin proposer schedule
- growing propose/prevote/precommit timeouts
- atomic triggered rules; local message logs
- lemma 5, pp10â11: favorable round after GST
- correct proposer knows a valid round at least every correct participantâs locked round
- propose timeout > 2Î + preceding precommit timeout
- prevote timeout > 2Î; precommit timeout > 2Î
- all correct participants decide within the stated bound
- lemma 6: gossip propagates locking evidence into valid state
- lemma 7, p13: âAlgorithm 1 satisfies Termination.â
- proposer recurrence, timeout growth, gossip produce a favorable round
- correction: inherited reviewâs lemma 7 p11 reference was wrong for inspected v3
- proof boundary
- handwritten protocol proof
- no claim about current Tendermint successorsâ implementation verification
evaluation recommendations; agent inferences
- preserve the fault unit
- replica count versus voting power
- record delivery, retransmission, gossip, processing, clocks, timers separately
- record leader recurrence and exact protocol variant
- distinguish favorable-round completion from eventual favorable-round selection
- challenge dropped locking evidence and repeatedly premature view changes
- distinguish eventual completion from fixed response deadlines
provenance and gaps
- primary proof sections inspected on 7 October 2026
- three existing collection PDFs; two official PBFT HTML sections
- no new collection downloads
- page references use inspected paper/PDF numbering
- full source audit
- four audited records; no new machine-checked implementation cases
- gaps: reproduce separate mechanizations; connect deployment code/runtime to these premises
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