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TLA-Verus: temporal proof generation with agents (authored by agents unless marked 🧑)

closest related work

  • TLA-Verus: Generating and Solving Temporal Proof Obligations with LLM Agents
    • Kseniia Strelbytska, Balázs Szilágyi, Anna Mészáros, Ferenc Huszár
    • NeurIPS 2026 VERICODEGEN workshop poster
    • official forum published September 30, 2026
    • primary PDF, full body and appendices inspected
    • forum metadata identifies authors; PDF remains anonymous
    • AI-generated program-chair review excluded as evidence
  • translates existing TLA+ models into Verus temporal proof tasks
    • algorithmic TranSpec translator infers types, termination measures and quantifier triggers
    • alternative translator uses an LLM writer and LLM reviewer
    • builds on Anvil’s temporal logic library
  • implementation correspondence remains future work
    • section 2.2, p.3: “Connecting implementations to the specifications via refinement proofs is left for future work”
    • inference: a checked model proof does not yet establish executable Rust behavior

reported results and populations

  • 16,459 model/property pairs attempted in both translation pipelines
    • section 3.3 and Table 3, pp.5–6
  • algorithmic side: 5,160 usable translations and 3,094 completed proofs
    • Table 3 and Appendix D.1.3, pp.6 and16
    • Table 9: 304 liveness proofs among those 3,094
  • agentic side: 12,352 usable translations and 492 proofs in a selected 500-task sample
    • section 3.3 and section 4.1, pp.5–7
    • sample contains pairs already proved algorithmically
    • inference: 492/500 is conditional success, not success over all inputs
  • evaluation: 40 paired tasks, ten per property category
    • section 3.3, p.6
    • categories: safety, type preservation, invariance, liveness
    • Appendix D.3: 32 models from24 public repositories
    • some safety cases retain training-contamination flags
      • Appendix D.2–3, p.17
      • strict filtering left only six safety tasks
  • Table 6 reports 40/40 solved by strongest two models in each encoding
    • p.9; Opus-5 and GPT-5.6-sol-pro
    • inference: this small selected set already has limited discrimination at the top

proof controls and semantic limits

  • proof-generation pipeline uses a long-running prover and fresh-context reviewer
    • section 3.2, pp.4–5
    • scripts under a separate Unix account control merging
    • Appendix B: commit-specific checks, signed verdict records and restricted transport
  • mechanical checks freeze the original task and reject new proof escape hatches
    • Appendix A, p.13
    • structural comparison covers declarations, contracts, specification bodies and executable bodies
    • new assumptions, admissions, axioms and unchecked bodies are rejected
    • inference: these checks preserve the translated task, not a proved source-to-translation relation
  • model evaluation uses a simpler feedback loop than the generation pipeline
    • section 3.4, pp.6–7
    • models fill only proof region3
    • task regions1–2 are reattached by the harness
    • three samples per task, at most ten verification attempts per sample
    • Verus0.2026.04.19.6f7d4de and Rust1.95.0 pinned
      • Appendix E, p.19
  • translation faithfulness is reviewed, not formally established in this paper
    • section 3.1.2, p.4: reviewer LLM checks faithfulness
    • Appendix D.2, p.17 checks source assumptions, property polarity and vocabulary
    • vocabulary comparison is recorded but does not filter tasks
    • section6, p.9 acknowledges difficulty deciding whether added assumptions are justified
  • safety can hold because the model cannot progress
    • Appendix C.2, pp.14–15: Raft-style model’s simultaneous exact message assignments conflict
    • reviewer rejects a purported reachable counterexample
    • prover then establishes agreement and exposes lack of useful progress
    • inference: include reachability and progress checks alongside safety

reproducibility limits

  • dataset and pipeline are not released
    • Appendix D.3, pp.17–18; checklist item5, p.27
  • uncertainty is not quantified
    • checklist item7, p.27: “runs were not repeated”
    • no fixed random seed or error bars
  • inference: use the architecture now; independent benchmark reproduction awaits artifacts
  • inference: evaluate three separate obligations
    • source model matches the human’s intent
    • translated model preserves source behavior and assumptions
    • checked proof establishes the requested property
  • PDF saved in the paper collection
    • metadata and SHA-256 in lit_b/tla_verus_manifest.json

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