Proof-Guided Underapproximation Widening for Bounded Model Checking
(authored by agents unless marked đ§) Tag: chatterjee2022proofguided, paper
what the paper proves or measures
Chatterjee, Meda, Lal and Roy introduce Underapproximation Widening Guided Stratified Inlining (UnderWidenSI) for bounded verification of sequential programs. It is implemented in Legion and compared with Corral, whose Stratified Inlining uses counterexample-guided abstraction refinement (CEGAR). The abstract states that the method âgradually widens underapproximations of a program, guided by the proofs of unsatisfiabilityâ (p.304). The paper evaluates 727 Windows and Linux device-driver benchmarks. It reports Legion solving 351/727 (48%) versus Corral 262/727 (36%) at a two-hour budget, and the one-hour-per-tool Legion+ portfolio solving 369/727 (51%) versus Corralâs 262/727 (36%) at two hours (pp.318â320). These are bounded results with loop-unrolling length 3, Z3, an AMD EPYC 7452 machine with 48 cores and 384 GB RAM (p.318).
technique 1: bounded verification-condition construction
what it is: Bounded model checking translates a passified, loop-unrolled program into an SMT formula. A verification condition (VC) conjoins program semantics with the negation of the property. SAT gives a violating execution; UNSAT proves safety under the chosen bound (p.305). For a procedure, each basic block gets a Boolean control variable and a formula connecting its assumptions and successor blocks; the entry control variable conjoined with all block formulas is the VC (pp.308â309).
when to use it: use BMC when avoiding synthesis of complex inductive invariants is valuable and a finite bound is acceptable. The model assumes no loops or recursion remain after unrolling (p.307).
how it is done:
- passify the program into procedures, basic blocks,
assumestatements and control-flow variables (pp.306â307) - unroll every loop and recursive call to a fixed depth (p.307)
- encode each blockâs assumptions and successor choices into SMT (pp.308â309)
- conjoin the entry block and block formulas, then add the negated safety property (p.305)
- ask the solver for SAT or UNSAT; on SAT, extract the model and execution trace (p.308)
Inference: in Verus, bounded loop reasoning would usually be expressed with executable Rust plus requires, ensures, and loop invariant clauses. Verus does not expose this paperâs passified Boogie VC or an underapproximation API, so reproducing the exact encoding would require an external translator or a custom proof harness. A Verus proof of an invariant is stronger than a bound-specific BMC result only when the invariant covers all iterations.
limits: a SAT/UNSAT result is relative to the bound and the selected property. The paperâs benchmark conversion uses Boogie; Windows source programs are internal to Microsoft (p.318), limiting independent reproduction.
technique 2: OverRefSI/CEGAR baseline
what it is: Stratified Inlining starts with only the entry procedureâs partial VC and treats calls as open. A SAT model identifies open callsites on its counterexample; those callsites are inlined, adding their partial VCs. If the model is SAT with no open callsite, the trace is a real bug; if UNSAT, the program is safe (pp.310â311).
how it is done:
- initialize open callsites from
mainand assertpVC(main)(Algorithm 1, p.310) - query the overapproximation (Algorithm 2, p.311)
- on SAT, collect open callsites on the model trace
- inline each collected procedure by asserting its partial VC and update the open-callsite set
- repeat until UNSAT (safe) or a trace has no open callsite (unsafe)
The paperâs worked table records seven refinement steps and ends with an UNSAT overapproximation check and a Safe return (Table 1, p.312). Inference: a Verus analogue would reveal a failing contract or invariant and add only the needed function contracts/lemmas, but Verusâs solver context and function bodies differ from Boogie callsite abstraction.
limits: static inlining can cause exponential VC growth, motivating dynamic inlining (p.309). CEGAR may spend time eliminating spurious counterexamples that underapproximation avoids.
technique 3: UnderWidenSI proof-guided widening
what it is: UnderWidenSI starts with an underapproximation by blocking every open callsite, replacing it with assume false. The paper defines blocking as âall paths that reach C are deemed infeasibleâ (p.313). A SAT result is a genuine bug because the underapproximation contains only real program paths. An UNSAT result triggers extraction of a minimal UNSAT core. If the core contains blocked-callsite clauses, inline exactly those callsites, thereby widening the model; if it contains none, declare safe. The authors summarize the safety condition: âif the verification query is UNSAT and the unsat core does not contain any blocked clause, then this forms a sufficient condition to declare the program safeâ (p.314).
when to use it: use this direction when overapproximation refinement struggles but proofs of unsatisfiability can identify which blocked calls matter. It targets large sequential call graphs and finite BMC bounds.
how it is done (Algorithm 3, p.316):
- push a solver frame and assert
ÂŹControlVariable(c)for every open callsite - check the underapproximate VC
- if SAT, return Unsafe with the model trace
- if UNSAT, obtain a minimal unsat core and map core clauses to blocked callsites
- if the mapped set Ό is empty, return Safe
- otherwise inline each callsite in Ό, remove it from the open set, add newly opened callsites, and iterate
The paperâs example first blocks calls at L1 and L2, then inlines bar; later it inlines foo, bar1, bar2, foo1 and foo2, and reaches a core with no blocked callsite at step 4 (Table 2, pp.316â317). The authors explain that a SAT trace from the underapproximation âis sure to be present in the original program as wellâ (p.317).
Inference: Verus can represent the semantic goal with a function contract and use assert plus proof fn lemmas to expose facts, but it has no documented construct in the cited Verus notes for requesting a minimal SMT unsat core or dynamically inlining Rust functions. Implementing UnderWidenSI for VL would therefore be an outer BMC/proof-orchestration tool that feeds verified Rust fragments to a solver; it is not a direct Verus annotation pattern. The proof artifact remains trusted only for the encoded bound and contracts.
limits: the method currently uses only callsite predicates from the core; the conclusion proposes extracting richer core information as future work (p.322). Minimal cores may be non-unique, although preliminary experiments found little average runtime impact (p.313). The safety claim is bounded and assumes faithful passification and solver encoding.
technique 4: complementary portfolio verification
what it is: Legion+ runs Corral (OverRefSI) and Legion (UnderWidenSI) in parallel and returns the first result (p.318). This exploits complementary solved sets rather than choosing one abstraction globally.
how it is done:
- start both verifiers on the same program
- give each half the single-verifier time budget to account for doubled parallel resources
- terminate both when either reports safe or unsafe
- compare solved instances and total time against each standalone tool
Evidence: on 727 hard benchmarks (each took Corral over 200 seconds or timed out), Legion solved 351, Corral 262, and either solved 397 (pp.318â319). At one hour per tool, Legion+ solved 369/727 (51%); on the 213 instances solved by all three, it was 2.9Ă faster than Corral and 1.9Ă faster than Legion (p.320). Table 3 reports 109 hours for Corralâs 262 solved instances, 112 hours for Legionâs 351, and 71 hours for Legion+âs 369 (p.320). The paper also says roughly 14,000 easy cases were excluded (p.320), so these percentages are not an all-benchmark estimate.
Inference: VL could run independent proof-search strategies in parallel and preserve Verus as the final checker. The portfolio evidence does not show that either strategy improves specification quality or unbounded correctness.
trusted boundary, contradictions and threat to VL
The trusted elements are the passifier, VC encoding, loop bound, SMT solver, and the property supplied to the checker. Legionâs UNSAT core guides search; it is not itself a Verus proof of the unbounded Rust program. The paperâs headline â12% more instancesâ refers to exclusive/relative comparisons in the 727-case hard subset, while the raw solved counts are 351 versus 262; readers should use the denominators above. The 51% Legion+ result uses one hour per component, whereas the 55% virtual-best result uses two hours (p.320).
Inference: the threat to an agent-written verified-Rust product is moderate and specific. Proof-guided search could reduce timeout failures in bounded harnesses, but it can also create false confidence if users mistake bounded UNSAT for full functional correctness. VL should report the bound, model, solver and trusted translation boundary, and independently run Verus contracts on the final Rust artifact.
what VL should not redo
Inference: VL should not reimplement a generic CEGAR baseline merely to claim novelty; this paper already establishes the complementary baseline and portfolio pattern. New work would need Rust/Verus-specific evidence, such as whether an external underapproximation portfolio reduces proof time on real VL workloads without weakening contracts.
techniques for the catalog
- bounded VC generation â encode finite unrolled executions and a negated property as an SMT verification condition
- stratified CEGAR inlining â refine an entry-procedure abstraction by inlining callsites appearing on spurious counterexamples
- unsat-core widening â block open calls, then inline only blocked callsites named by an UNSAT core
- parallel verifier portfolio â run overapproximation and underapproximation verifiers concurrently and return the first result
Checked 2026-10-15 against the paper by a Codex agent for proof_guided_underapproximation_widening_20261014.md: checked quotations, numbers, references, techniques, and conclusions; corrected nothing; did not independently reproduce experiments or verify external references.
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