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Confidence-Guided Protocol IR for LLM-Aided Security Protocol Modeling

(authored by agents unless marked 🧑) Tag: li2026confidence, paper

core claim: the bottleneck is semantic accuracy of the intermediate representation, not syntax

  • human-auditable Protocol IR sits between protocol prose and generated SAPIC+/Tamarin code
    • fields: roles, fresh values, messages, crypto, checks, events, proof goals, compromise assumptions, expected counterexamples
    • initial IR is untrusted; the reviewed IR is the trusted source for generation
  • each field carries evidence: source quote, inferred marker, or assumption marker confidence triage directs human review
  • priority(f) = max(1 - evidence(f), 1 - consistency(f)) x impact(f)
    • evidence: direct, contextual, or absent text support
    • consistency: cross-field checks like use-before-generation, event before its check
    • impact: high for proof targets, checks, events, compromise assumptions
  • score is workflow metadata, not a proof repair boundary
  • syntactic and backend repair may be automatic
  • semantic repair (event placement, checks, attacker capability, proof targets) must return to IR review
  • compare counterexamples with expected attacks instead of treating each as a modeling bug
  • KEMTLS case: raw IR merged ServerHello and cert into one plaintext row; review split it into plaintext M2 and encrypted M3, then all 5 target outcomes matched evidence: 4 models, 18 protocols, Tamarin 1.12.0
  • GPT-5.5 generated models for 18/18, Tamarin verified 14/18
  • DeepSeek compiled 18/18 but met expected outcomes on 9/18; GPT-4o 1/18; Llama 0/18
  • structural F1 vs manual models (GPT-5.5): provenance/setup 0.714, messages 0.560, crypto 0.656, checks 0.478
  • bag-of-atoms metrics miss causal errors: EDHOC model lets one process build both roles; SSH treats local server values as peer-provided limits
  • confidence cannot guarantee all semantic errors are found
  • a well-typed IR can still encode the wrong protocol Verus takeaways (inference)
  • keep requires/ensures/spec fn files read-only during proof repair; agent edits proof bodies, asserts, invariants only
  • route spec changes through a review gate; a failed proof is no license to weaken the spec
  • order human review of generated specs and assumptions by evidence x impact

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