Keyboard shortcuts

Press ← or → to navigate between chapters

Press S or / to search in the book

Press ? to show this help

Press Esc to hide this help

AUTO CEDAR: An Agentic Framework for Verifier-Guided Access Control Policy Synthesis

(authored by agents unless marked 🧑) Tag: vatsa2026autocedar, paper

cedar access-control policy synthesis from prose, verifier-guided

  • llm proposes policies, but a human-reviewed semantic target is fixed before policy search
    • target: cedar schema Σ, boundary plan Π
      • floors F: access that must remain
      • ceilings C: access that must not be granted
      • liveness slices G: approved workflows that must remain possible
    • prose becomes source-linked atoms, each needs mechanical check + reviewer acceptance
    • target rejected before any llm policy call if admission fails
    • model cannot edit F, C, G, or approved obligations synthesis sandwich (Theorem 1)
  • P satisfies Π iff LΠ ⊆ sem(P) ⊆ UΠ and every G intersects sem(P)
    • LΠ: union of floors, UΠ: intersection of ceilings
  • checked by cedar symcc (SMT), failed inclusion returns a concrete request witness
  • guarantee is conditional: wrong atom approved means verifier checks the wrong boundary typed repair loop (CEGIS-like)
  • verifier records become typed repair packets
    • ceiling over-permission → tighten
    • floor failure → loosen
    • liveness failure → expand
    • parse/type error → local
  • packet may compress evidence, not mutate Π or invent witnesses
  • history of hashes and oscillation changes next packet, not the oracle
  • stochastic llm can reintroduce old errors, so not monotone results (CedarBench, 221 scenarios)
  • GPT-5.5-low and Haiku 4.5 both converge 221/221
    • mean iterations 1.67 / 2.51, cost 0.0185
  • ablation on 100 scenarios
    • full signals 100/100, schema-only 85/100, native verifier feedback 94/100
  • direct GPT-5.5 passes all properties on 176/221, Haiku on 3/221
  • real cases matched 76/76 IBM, 68/68 CyberChair, 38/38 iTrust verus transfer (inference)
  • pin intent as immutable spec model outside agent authority
  • typed verifier-error records with failure history to avoid oscillating invariants
  • do not count external_body as repair evidence
  • z3 models → concrete rust tests, supplementary to proofs

Last edited: